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Abstract
We propose a decision theoretic model akin to that of Savage [19] that
is useful for defining causal effects. Within this framework, we define what
it means for a decision maker (DM) to act as if the relation between two
variables is causal. Next, we provide axioms on preferences and show that
these axioms are equivalent to the existence of a (unique) directed acyclic
graph (DAG) that represents the DM’s preferences. The notion of represen-
tation has two components: the graph factorizes the conditional indepen-
dence properties of the DM’s subjective beliefs and arrows point from cause
to effect. Finally, we explore the connection between our representation and
models used in the statistical causality literature (for example, Pearl [16]).
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1 Introduction
Consider a statistician (say, Alex) who investigates the relation between intel-
lectual ability, education level, and lifetime earnings of a particular citizen (say,
Mr. Kane). As a good statistician, Alex is able to choose between the following
options. A safe bet that pays $0 for sure or the risky bet defined below.
• If Mr. Kane has a college degree and earns more than $ 100K a year, Alex
gets $1
• If Mr. Kane has a college degree and earns less than $ 100K a year, Alex
gets -$1
• If Mr. Kane does not have a college degree, Alex gets $0.
For concreteness, suppose Alex chooses the risky option. Her behavior reveals
that, conditional on obtaining a college degree, Alex believes that it is more likely
that Mr. Kane earns more than $100K a year than it is that he earns less than
$100K a year. Now, assume Alex is presented with the same choice but “college
degree” is replaced with “high school degree”; moreover, assume that Alex now
prefers receiving $0 for sure. Her behavior reveals that, conditional on obtaining
a high school degree, Alex believes that it is more likely that Mr. Kane earns
less than $100K a year than it is that he earns more than $100K a year. Alex’s
behavior reveals that she believes Mr. Kane’s education level and lifetime earnings
are qualitatively positively correlated : she accepts a $1 gamble that Mr. Kane is
making more than $100K a year conditional on observing that Mr. Kane obtained
a college degree but not conditional on observing that Mr. Kane obtained only
a high school degree. Finally, if Alex is probabilistically sophisticated, then we
can represent her beliefs with a joint probability distribution over all relevant
variables. In particular, this probability distribution is such that education and
lifetime earnings are positively correlated.
Alex is now approached by a benevolent politician who wants to improve his
constituents’ lifetime earnings. Since Alex believes that education and earnings
are positively correlated, this politician expects that a policy that forces everyone
to obtain a college degree would be useful to improve lifetime earnings. However,
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Alex rejects that conclusion. While she believes Mr. Kane’s education level and
lifetime earnings are positively correlated, she is of the opinion that policies that
change the population’s education levels while keeping all other things equal are
useless for affecting lifetime earnings. Alex believes that high education levels are
associated with high intellectual ability, that high intellectual ability is associated
with higher lifetime earnings, and that this is the only channel through which
education levels and lifetime earnings are related. Thus, a policy that improves
education levels but leaves intellectual ability unchanged is useless to improve
lifetime earnings.
The apparent tension between Alex’s belief that education and earnings are pos-
itively correlated, while maintaining a position that policies that affect only educa-
tion are useless to affect lifetime earnings, is rationalized by the adage “correlation
is not causation”. In this context, causation has a specific meaning: a variable
subjectively causes another variable if, holding all other variables constant, policy
interventions on the first variable affect Alex’s beliefs about the second. That Alex
believes education policies are useless to affect lifetime earnings (holding fixed in-
tellectual ability) means that she believes education levels do not cause lifetime
earnings.
The above definition of causal effect is entirely subjective. As such, this defi-
nition is not about objective truths or uncovering the laws of nature. However,
this definition captures exactly how causality is understood in economics. In eco-
nomics, causal relations are correlations that, in the analyst’s subjective opinion,
are valid grounds for making policy recommendations. While disagreements exist
with regards to how one arrives at the conclusion that an observed correlation is
sufficient grounds for making policy recommendations, the definition of causation
as the bridge between correlation and policy recommendation is undisputed. This
dichotomy — when are two variables correlated versus when is one variable a use-
ful policy tool to affect the other — is the foundation of our definition of causal
effect. By identifying a unique numerical representation of this definition, our pa-
per provides a foundation for selecting models with which empirical researchers
can estimate causal effects.
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The purpose of axiomatic exercises like Savage’s [19] is to provide a link between
some numerical model and the way a rational decision maker (henceforth, DM)
approaches the issue of interest (in this case, causality). The goal is to guarantee
that the numerical model treats the object of study the way a rational DM would.
For empirical research, the role of the DM is played by the researcher’s econometric
model (which, presumably, wants to behave rationally), and the role of the DM’s
beliefs is played by the probability laws the researcher feeds into the numerical
model. The subjectivity in the definition of causation reflects that researchers
need to make assumptions about the causal structure of the world, and these
assumptions carry on the the researcher’s econometric model (i.e. the DM in our
paper). This paper provides a theoretical foundation for selecting amongst models
of causality by proposing normative axioms for how the analyst’s model should
treat uncertainty.
This paper is structured in three steps. First, we propose a decision problem
similar to Savage’s: there is a set of states, a set of acts mapping states into
monetary amounts, and a DM who chooses among acts. The DM makes choices
as if picking the best alternative according to a preference relation. This language
is sufficient to talk about the subjective correlation structure in the DM’s beliefs.
However, to discuss causal effects, we also need language to talk about preferences
over intervention policies that affect the states. Therefore, we extend the language
in the Savage model to accommodate for the possibility of choosing policies that
affect the states. Section 2 describes the model, and Section 3 formally defines
causality. Second, we propose a set of axioms that capture –in a normative sense–
how a rational DM should treat uncertainty and causality. Section 4 presents the
axioms. Finally, we conduct a standard decision theoretic analysis: we propose
a numerical representation of the DM’s beliefs (see section 5) and show that our
axioms hold if, and only if, we can numerically represent the DM’s beliefs. Section
6 presents our main theorems.
As the reader may anticipate, the statistics, computer science, and economics
literature addressing causal effects is extensive. The related literature is discussed
in Section 7, and we delay a discussion of it until after we present our results
because our results depend on a series of definitions and terms related to various
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literatures. Hence, we do not yet have the language to meaningfully discuss the
related work.
2 Model and notation
2.1 General notation
The following useful notation is used throughout this paper. The setN “ t1, ..., Nu
is a set of indexes. For each J Ă N , let tXj : j P J u be a family of sets indexed
by J . We denote by XJ “ ΠjPJXj the Cartesian products of the family and by
xJ “ pxjqjPJ a canonical element in XJ . Moreover, all complements are taken
with respect to N : if J Ă N , then J A ” N zJ . Finally, if J Ă N and E Ă XJ ,
then 1E : XJ Ñ t0, 1u denotes the indicator function that event E has occurred;
that is, 1EpxJ q “ 1ô xJ P E.
The following notation refers to the graph theoretic component of the model. A
directed graph is a pair pV,Eq such that V is a (finite) set of nodes and E Ă V ˆV
is the set of edges. If two nodes, i and j, satisfy that pi, jq P E, we simplify the
notation by writing i Ñ j. Moreover, the set of parents for a node v P V is the
set Papvq “ tv1 P V : pv1, vq P Eu. A node v P V is a descendant of a node v1 P V
whenever a directed path exists from v1 to v. Formally, if a sequence pv1, ..., vT q P
V T exists such that v1 “ v
1, vt is a parent of vt`1 for each t P t1, ..., T ´ 1u, and
vT “ v. Likewise, v
1 is an ancestor of v whenever v is a descendant of v1. A directed
graph is a DAG if, and only if, for all v P V , v is not a descendant of v. We denote
by Dpvq the set of descendants of v and by NDpvq the set of non-descendants.
2.2 Model description
Our DM faces a variant of the standard Savage problem. The state space is
S “ ΠNi“1Xi, where each Xi is finite. We make this assumption for technical
simplicity because causality is orthogonal to whether state spaces are finite or
infinite. We let N “ t1, ..., Nu, and we call each i P N a variable. Set A “ RS is
the set of Savage acts, and a DM has preferences ą over A.
However, our problem differs from Savage’s since we incorporate policies that
affect the states. This added language allows us to distinguish correlations from
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other types of relations among variables. A set of intervention policies is a set
P “ ΠNi“1pXi Y tHuq. The interpretation is as follows. Let a policy p P P be such
that pi “ H for some i P N . Then, this policy leaves variable i unaffected; that
is, i is determined as it would have been in a standard Savage world. However, if
for some j P N , we have pj “ xj P Xj , then policy j forces variable j to take the
value xj ; that is, the value of variable j is not determined as it would have been
in a Savage problem but is chosen by the DM. Therefore, each policy implies a
collection of interventions of the state space. Our model is one where the DM first
chooses a policy from the set of all policies, and then chooses a Savage act from
the set of acts defined over the non-intervened variables.
We now define the primitive choice domain for our DM. Let p P P be any policy,
and let N ppq “ ti P N : pi “ Hu. That is, N ppq are the variables that p leaves
unaffected. Furthermore, let Appq ” RXN ppq be the set of acts defined over the
variables that p leaves unaffected. Then, the primitive domain of choice for the
DM is the set tpp, aq : p P P, a P Appqu. That is, our DM’s problem is to select an
intervention policy and a Savage act over the non-intervened variables. We endow
this DM with a preference relation ą¯ on tpp, aq : p P P, a P Appqu.
Given ą¯, each p induces an intervention preference on Appq: for each p P P
and each f, g P Appq, we say f ąp g if, and only if, pp, fqą¯pp, gq. Since our
axioms are focused on the DM’s intervention preferences, it is convenient to express
intervention preferences explicitly in terms of the values at which the variables are
intervened. For each policy p P P, if pN ppqA “ xN ppqA , we use ąxN ppqA to denote
ąp
N ppqA
. The special case where p “ pH, ...,Hq, so that no variables are intervened,
corresponds to the DM’s preferences in a standard Savage world. For such a p, we
use ąpH,...,Hq“ą for notational simplicity.
From intervention preferences we obtain intervention beliefs. For each p P P, we
say that ąp has a belief representation if there is a probability distribution µp on
XN ppq such that for all E, F Ă XN ppq, µppEq ą µppF q if, and only if, 1E ąp 1F .
When such a representation exists we say µp is an intervention belief.
Intervention preferences (resp. beliefs) look like Savage conditional preferences
(resp. beliefs) but have important differences. Savage conditional preferences
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capture betting behavior conditional on the DM observing that a certain event
was realized, whereas intervention preferences (beliefs) capture betting behavior
after a controlled intervention of the relevant variables. To illustrate the difference,
consider Example 1 below. Conditional preferences (resp. beliefs) are statements
about item r1.s, whereas intervention preferences (resp. beliefs) are statements
about item r2.s. These are clearly different statements that do not imply one
another. Therefore, we need language to distinguish these two distinct decision
problems and intervention policies provide such language.
Example 1. Let acts f and g over lifetime earnings be defined as follows. Act f
pays $1 if lifetime earnings are greater than $100K per year and ´$1 otherwise.
Act g is the opposite: it pays ´$1 if lifetime earnings are greater than $100K per
year and $1 otherwise. Consider the following statements:
1. “Having observed that Mr. Kane earned a college degree (of his own free will
and ability), Alex prefers f to g.”
2. “Having forced Mr. Kane to obtain a college degree (regardless of his desire
or ability to do so) Alex prefers f to g”.
Because this paper is concerned with understanding what a rational agent’s
approach to causality is, the role of axioms is exclusively normative. Whether
actual humans adhere to these axioms is orthogonal to this paper. While the
counter-factual based setup presented above may seem hard to test in a laboratory
with actual human subjects, this is not the objective of the exercise at hand.
Since the DM in our paper is an analyst’s econometric model of the world, the
only question that matters is whether the analyst finds the axioms normatively
appealing or not. Moreover, econometric models (as opposed to human subjects
in a laboratory) are naturally built to handle counter-factual analysis of the sort
presented above.
3 Definition of causal effect
In this section we introduce the definition of causal effect, which formalizes the
intuitive definition given in Section 1.
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We begin by introducing the definition of intervention independence. Consider
a set of variables K and two variables i, j R K. Informally, i is K-independent of
j if, after eliminating the possibility that i and j are related through variables in
K, the choice of acts over i is insensitive to interventions of j. Formally, we say
that i is K-independent of j if the following holds: p@xK P XKq, p@xj , x
1
j P Xjq,
and p@f, g P RXiq,
f ąxj ,xK g ô f ąx1j ,xK g,
f ąxj ,xK g ô f ąxK g.
1
The first line indicates that having intervened K at value xK, intervening j at
different values does not affect the DM’s choice of act in RXi . The second line
indicates that having intervened K, the ability to intervene j at all, regardless of
the values at which it is intervened, does not affect the DM’s choice of act in RXi.
Note that the second of these conditions implies the first. Indeed, if the second
condition holds, then we have that for all xj , x
1
j ,
f ąxj ,xK g ô f ąxK g ô f ąx1j ,xK g,
so the first equation also holds. This motivates the formal definition of intervention
independence.
Definition 1. For all i, j P N and K such that i, j R K, we say variable i is
K-independent of variable j if for all f, g P RXi,
f ąxj ,xK g ô f ąxK g,
To illustrate Definition 1, consider a DM who believes Ability has a direct
impact on Education and that Education has a direct impact on Lifetime earnings
but that Ability has no direct impact on Lifetime earnings. This is depicted in
Figure 1 below. If a, a1 P A are two ability levels and f , g P RL are two acts on
lifetime earnings, we might have the DM behave as follows: f ąa g and g ąa1 f .
This reversal indicates that A and E are not tHu-independent, which is intuitive:
interventions of A affect beliefs about E, and beliefs about E affect beliefs about
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L. However, this is an effect of A on L that is mediated through E. As such,
we don’t want to use this as basis to claim that A causes L. The correct way to
capture the causal effect of A on L is to look at intervention preferences ąpa,eq as
a function of a, for each fixed e P E. In other words, we want to ask if A and L
are tEu-independent. This motivates the formal definition of causal effect.
A E L
Figure 1: Variable A has no direct causal effect on L, but non-ceteris paribus
interventions of A affect L through E.
Definition 2. For all i, j P N , we say variable j causes variable i if i is not
ti, juA-independent of j.
Let Capiq “ tj P N : j causes iu denote the causal set of i.
Finally, we say j is an indirect cause of i if there is a sequence j0, ..., jT such that,
for all t P t0, ..., T ´ 1u, jt causes jt`1, j0 “ j and jT “ i. We denote the set of
indirect causes of a variable i with ICapiq.
Finally, if a variable i is such that Capiq “ H, we say i is an exogenous
primitive; otherwise, we say it is an endogenous variable. Indeed, when a DM forms
a causal model of the world, the set of primitives of such model is precisely the set
of variables that are not caused by any other variable in the model. Exogenous
primitives are relevant in our discussion of Axiom 1.
We conclude this section by defining the causal graph associated with a pref-
erence, ą¯. Causal graphs are an integral part of our representation, which is
introduced in Section 5. Given ą¯, draw a graph by letting the set of nodes be
the set of variables and the set of arrows be defined by the causal sets, that is, by
letting j Ñ iô j P Capiq. This graph is well defined because Capiq is well defined
for each i P N . We denote such a graph as Gpą¯q.
Definition 3. Let ą¯ be a preference and tCapiq : i P N u be the collection of causal
sets derived from ą¯. Define Gpą¯q “ pV,Eq by setting V “ N and E “ tpj, iq : j P
Capiqu.
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4 Axioms
Our axioms are normative statements about how the DM should treat uncertainty
as a function of the DM’s causal model. Hence, our axioms tackle variations of
the following question: given the DM’s causal graph as per Definition 3, what
normative restrictions should we impose on the DM’s intervention beliefs?
As such, the axioms are about conditional independence properties of the various
ąp preferences. Since the act notation for conditional independence is somewhat
heavy, we use the following simplifying notation.
Definition 4. Let i P N and let J ,K,H Ă N be disjoint sets such that i R
J YKYH. We say that i is independent of J conditional on K after intervening
H if the following is true for all xpJYKYHq P X
pJYKYHq and all f, g P RXi:
1xKf ąxH 1xKg ô 1xK1xJ f ąxH 1xK1xJ g. (1)
When the above holds, we write
i KH J |K. (2)
In the case J is a singleton, J “ tju, we simply write
i KH j|K. (3)
In terms of behavior, conditional independence says the following: i and j are
independent if a DM would never pay for information about j when their task
is to predict i. Imagine a DM intervened variables H to a specific level. For
instance, the DM carried out a controlled experiment, or this could simply be a
thought experiment. Imagine further that the DM observed a specific realization
of variables in K. In this context, if the DM had to choose choice between f and g
he would have to compare 1xKf with 1xKg using preferences ąxH . To aid the DM’s
decision, someone offers to reveal the DM the value of the variables in J at a fee
of ε ą 0. Is there an ε small enough that the DM would purchase this information
10
revelation? If the DM bought this information about J then his problem becomes
to compare 1xK1xJ f with 1xK1xJ g using preferences ąxH . Since the definition
states that his choice under both situations is the same, the information is useless.
Thus, the DM would not accept any price ε ą 0.
We start with Assumption 1, which defines all relevant aspects of the DM’s
probabilistic model. To state Assumption 1 we recall the definition of a subjective
expected utility preference. We say that a preference ąp is a (monotone) subjective
expected utility preference if there exists a unique probability distribution, µp P
∆pXN ppqq, and a (monotone increasing) function up : R Ñ R such that for all
acts f, g P RX
N ppq
condition 4 below holds. There are many axiomatizations of
monotone expected utility preference that fit the framework of our model, such as
Gul [5] , Fishburn [2], and Theorem 3 in Karni [12], amongst others. We let the
reader pick their favorite axiomatization.
f ąp g ô
ÿ
xN ppqPXN ppq
uppfpxN ppqqqµppxN ppqq ą
ÿ
xN ppqPXN ppq
uppgpxN ppqqqµppxN ppqq. (4)
Assumption 1. For each J Ă N , the following are true.
i- For each p P P, the preferences ąp are monotone subjective expected utility
preferences.
ii- The states space is complete: p@i, j P N q, p@xN ztiu P XN ztiuq, and p@f, g P
R
Xiq, if j P Capiq, then f ąxN ztiu g ô 1xjf ąxN zti,ju 1xjg.
iii- There are no null states: for all x P X, 1x ą 1X0.
iv- Policies do not affect preferences: p@x, y P Rq, p@p, p1 P Pq, 1XN ppqx ąp
1XN ppqy ô 1XN pp1qx ąp1 1XN pp1qy
Assumption 1 captures the basics of the DM’s beliefs. As such it is orthogonal
to issues of causation, hence the reason we don’t refer to it as an axiom per se.
Below, we examine each of the restrictions Assumption 1.
As we already mentioned, many axiomatizations exist that will deliver item ri.s,
each with it’s own advantages and disadvantages. We let the reader decide what
their favorite axiomatization of monotone expected utility is. The importance of
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item ri.s is that all intervention preferences are probabilistically sophisticated, so
intervention beliefs are always well defined. Item riii.s states that getting paid
$1 if realization x P X occurs is strictly preferred to getting $0 for sure, thus
guaranteeing that all states receive positive probability. Item riv.s rules out the
possibility that policies have a direct impact on the Bernoulli utility indexes, thus
making up “ u
1
p for all p, p
1 P P.2
Item rii.s in Assumption 1 says that the state space is complete: given two
variables (say, i and j), the state space includes all variables that could mediate
effects between i and j. Once all variables k ‰ i, j are intervened, either i causes
j, j causes i, or the i and j are independent. If j causes i, since all possible
confounding variables have been intervened, observing that xj P Xj was realized
or intervening variable j to value xj should lead to the same preference over R
Xi.
Violations of this axiom are reasonable only if the state space is missing some
potential confounding variables. In line with Savage [19], we assume that the state
space is complete so there are no missing confounding variables.
That the state space is complete has the following implication for the repre-
sentation of preferences. Pick two variables (say, i an j) and assume all other
variables are intervened at a level xti,juA . Let µxti,juA be the belief representation of
ąxti,juA
. In this 2-variable environment, correlation and causation should coincide.
Therefore, if i causes j, conditioning on j or intervening j should lead to the same
posteriors about i. Namely,
µxti,juA pxi|xjq “ µxti,juA ,xjpxiq. (5)
Importantly, this relation is not symmetric. If j does not cause i then the sym-
metric expression µxti,juA pxj |xiq “ µxti,juA ,xipxjq is false. The left hand side is a
non-constant function of xi whereas the right hand side is constant in xi. Thus,
under complete state spaces, equation 5 identifies the direction of causality. We
will use this observation in Section 5 when defining when a graph represents a
preference .
2This assumption is not strictly needed but it simplifies notation in some proofs. Since
causality is orthogonal to whether Bernoulli utilities are constant in P , we feel comfortable
keeping this assumption.
12
That the state space is complete does not imply the DM must know what all the
relevant variables are. For instance, assume Alex in the introduction is worried that
the interaction between Ability, Education and Lifetime earnings might be affected
by some other variable. Concretely, she thinks some other variable might influence
education levels: she does not know what this variable is, but she believes it exists.
For concreteness, denote this variable as “Unknown but possibly exiting variable”.
Assumption 1 says that in her state space she should include such a variable.
Therefore her state space should not be AˆEˆL but rather AˆEˆLˆU , where U
stands for “Unknown but possibly existing variable”. In short, Assumption 1 does
allow the econometrician to add variables that act as proxies for unknown shocks
to the system. Indeed, modeling a potential unknown confounder as exogenous
noise shocks is a common way to proceed in empirical studies.
Assumption 1 states that the DM is probabilistically sophisticated but is silent
about the statistical properties of causal sets. Without further axioms to discipline
how the causal sets behave, we cannot guarantee that these sets will have any
properties that we normatively associate with causation. Axioms 1 through 3
provide such discipline.
Axiom 1. For all i P N , i is not an indirect cause of i.
Axiom 1 is equivalent to the following statement: for each set of variables I Ă N ,
there exists i P I such that Capiq X I “ H. That is, if the DM is asked to ex-
plain the relation between variables in I and only those in I, the DM has an
explanation that involves at least one exogenous primitive relative to I. Models
without primitives describe identities rather than relations among logically inde-
pendent variables. Therefore, Axiom 1 states that the DM’s state space includes
only logically independent variables.
A potential critique of this axiom is that certain systems are inherently cyclical.
For instance, the relation between the speed of a car, the distance traveled by the
car, and the time traveled by the car is inherently circular: any two determine
the third. The problem with this system is that speed is not caused by distance
and time traveled; rather, speed is defined in terms of distance and time traveled.
Therefore, the model includes variables that are not logically independent of one
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another. The correct model to analyze this situation is one in which the only
variables are time and distance traveled by the car, as these variables are the only
logically independent variables. In this sense, the assumption that no causal cycles
exist is sensible.
A related critique of Axiom 1 is that it precludes the DM from viewing the
world as a system of recursive structural equations. As such, Axiom 1 could
be seen as precluding the DM from reasoning in terms of equilibrium equations
(see, for example, the critique in Heckman and Pinto [9]). This assessment stems
from interpreting functional relations as causal relations. However, the equations
in a model (in particular, equilibrium equations) are succinct descriptions of the
specific values that the variables may obtain; they say nothing of how those values
are achieved. As such, causality and equilibrium equations are orthogonal issues.
To make the above discussion concrete, consider a general equilibrium model
with aggregate demand curve D and aggregate supply curve S. Equilibrium is de-
fined as follows: pp˚, q˚q constitute an equilibrium if Dpp˚q “ q˚ and Spp˚q “ q˚.
Note that this is a definition; as such, equilibrium price and equilibrium quantity
are not logically independent. These equations describe the values one should
expect for prices and quantities but are silent regarding the mechanism that gen-
erated them. This silence motivates the equilibrium convergence literature. For
example, a tatoˆnnement convergence process is compatible with the general equi-
librium equations without invoking feedback loops: a DM posits that prices in
period t cause quantities in period t (via consumer/producer optimization) and
that quantities in period t cause prices in period t ` 1 (through a process that
increases/decreases the price in response to excess demand/supply). That the sys-
tem stabilizes at a point where pt “ pt`1 “ p
˚ and qt “ qt`1 “ q
˚ is orthogonal
to the issue of causation. In short, one should not mistake functional equations,
which simply describe relations between variables, for causal statements.
Axiom 2. For all i P N , if J Ă Capiq and H Ă N ztiu is disjoint from J ,
i MH pCapiqzJ zHq | J
Axiom 2 captures the following normative property about causation: the causes
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of a variable (say, i) are the most proximal sources of information about i. Suppose
one was to slice the set Capiq into three slices: J , H and CapiqzJ zH. If one
intervened the slice H, and observed the value of variables in J , would one pay for
information on the remaining variables j P CapiqzHzJ ? If j is a most proximal
source of information about i then there should be an ε ą 0 small enough that
the DM should pay ε in exchange for information on the value of these variables j.
If j was rendered useless for prediction after information on the other causes was
obtained, then j would not itself be a proximal source of information about i, and
therefore should not be called a “cause” of i. As a final remark, notice that Axiom
2 is symmetric in the following sense: the only fundamental sources of information
about i are are causes of i, and those variables that are directly caused by i.
Axiom 3. p@i, j P N q, p@K, J Ă N zti, juq, pJ X K “ Hq, if i R Capjq and
j R Capiq then
i KK j|pCapiq Y Capjq Y J qzK
While axiom 2 describes the conditional independence properties of variables
that are directly related to each other, Axiom 3 analyzes the independence prop-
erties of variables that are not directly related to each other. Axiom 3 states that
two variables that do not cause each other are independent of each other once we
condition on any set that include i and j’s causes.
To understand Axiom 3’s normative appeal, consider the DAG in figure 2 below,
where arrows point from cause to effect. If a DM had to predict the value of i
and he knew the realizations xb and xc (and perhaps some other non-causes, say
k), should the DM pay for information about the realization of j? Our axiom
says the DM shouldn’t pay for this information, which is quite sensible: once the
DM knows the values of b and c, he knows all there is to know about the relation
between i and j. Thus, extra information on j is useless to predict the value of i.
15
bi
j
c k
Figure 2: i and j are independent conditional on their respective causes.
A more general analysis of Axiom 3 proceeds in three steps. First, it is norma-
tively appealing to say that i and j are not independent. Because i causes c and c
causes j, it stands to reason that any information we have about i will (via c) pro-
vide information about j. Likewise, b provides another link between i and j: since
b is a common cause of both, then any information we have about i should allow us
to make inferences about b and, in turn, inferences about j. Second, because nei-
ther i causes j nor vice-versa, any information i provides about j will be mediated
by some variable. Third, the mediating variable will either be a cause of i, a cause
of j, or both. Indeed, if i provided information about j that is not mediated by
any cause of j then i is providing information about j that is more proximal than
the information contained by any cause of j. Therefore, i should itself be a cause
of j, which it is not. Putting these three observations together implies that, if we
condition on both the causes of i and of j then i and j should be conditionally
independent. Finally, Axiom 3 states the same condition remains true if we where
to make the choice of f vs g contingent on some additional non-causes, J .
While Axioms 1 through 3 are our basic axioms, Axiom 4 is a supplementary
axiom that is relevant for Theorem 2. We present it here in the interest of keeping
all axioms, and their corresponding discussions, contained within a single section.
Axiom 4. p@i P N q, p@J Ă N ztiuq p@f, g P RXiq, p@xCapiqYJ P XCapiqYJ q,
1txCapiquf ą 1txCapiqug ô 1xCapiqzJ f ąxJ 1xCapiqzJ g.
Axiom 4 states that two particular decision problems are equivalent. Given
a variable i and acts f, g P RXi, the first problem is to choose f or g when
their payments are contingent on the causes of i obtaining a particular value,
xCapiq. In the second decision problem, the DM intervenes a subset of causes
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of i, (say, J Ă Capiq) to the value xJ , and the payments of f and g are now
contingent on the values of the non-intervened causes, xJ A , being realized. From a
numerical standpoint, both these situations result in the same value for the causes
of i (namely, xCapiq); the difference is how those values are achieved. In the first
problem it is simply by selecting a standard Savage conditional act, whilst in the
second problem it is by a combination of interventions and Savage conditional acts
acts. Because Axiom 4 imposes that these two problems are treated identically,
Axiom 4 implies that the only aspect of interventions that matters is the value the
intervention sets for the variable. In other words, intervening a variable does not
change the DMs structural view of the world.
We use Figure 3 below to illustrate the normative appeal of Axiom 4.
j
k w
i
Figure 3: Observing or intervening j makes the DM update differently about k. This
difference in updating may affect the DM’s beliefs about i.
First, we explain why Axiom 4 involves sets that are weakly larger than Capiq.
Suppose a DM has to choose between two acts over i (say, f, g P RXi) whose
payments are contingent on j taking value xj. That is, the DM has to choose
between 1xjf and 1xjg. Note that tju is a strict subset of Capiq. Observing that
j took the value xj gives the DM information about the value of k; in turn, this
information about k gives the DM information about w which, ultimately, gives the
DM information about i. Thus, observing that j took the value xj is informative
about i in two ways: directly, because j P Capiq, and indirectly, via k and w. If
the DM intervenes j at value xj , he receives the same direct information about i
but loses the indirect information mediated via k and w. Thus, the DM could say
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that 1xjf ą 1xjg but g ąxj f . Clearly, observing xj or intervening variable j to
value xj are different problems in terms of the DMs updating.
Now consider the situation above but where the payments of f and g involve
all causes i, j and w. That is, for some xj and xw, the DM chooses between
1xj ,xwf and 1xj ,xwg. For concreteness, suppose that 1xj ,xwf ą 1xj ,xwg. If the
DM intervened j to the value xj and then had to choose between 1xwf and 1xwg,
would the DM lose any information? Put differently: if at a cost ε ą 0 the DM
could intervene the value of j to xj , rather than simply conditioning his choice on
value xj being realized, is there a ε ą 0 small enough that the DM would pay for
this option? In both problems, w is observed to take the value xw; therefore, any
information j could indirectly provide about i through w is still directly captured
in the observation of xw. Thus, intervening j entails no information loss relative to
simply observing that j took the value xj . Thus, the DM has the same information
in both problems and should thus treat the problems equivalently. This result is
precisely what Axiom 4 requires.
Both of the above discussions treated J Ă Capiq, but to complete our discussion
of Axiom 4 we must allow that J contains non-causes of i. Axiom 4 states that
once we know the value of all the causes of i, intervening variables that are not
causes of i is uninformative about i. In Figure 3, if an act’s payments are contingent
on xw and xj , then intervening the value of k to some xk is uninformative about i.
5 Representation
In this section we define the representation we seek for ą¯. Since ą¯ will ultimately
be associated with a collection of probability distributions, we proceed in two steps.
First define what it means for a DAG to represent a single probability distribution.
Then, we generalize to a family of probability distributions. For a reminder of our
graph theoretic notation see Section 2.1.
Lauritzen et al. [14] provide a definition for when a DAG represents a probability
distribution, say µ P ∆pΠiPNXiq. The objective of such a definition is to represent
graphically the conditional independence structure of µ. Let µ P ∆pΠiPNXiq, and
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let G “ pt1, ..., Nu, Eq be a DAG. The chain rule implies the following
p@x P ΠiPNXiq, µpxq “ Π
N
i“1µpxi|NDpiqq. (6)
Now consider the DAG in figure 4 below.
a
b
j
w
i k z
Figure 4: A DAG representing the distribution
µpa, b, w, j, i, k, zq “ µpaqµpwqµpb|w, aqµpj|aqµpi|w, jqµpk|iqµpz|kq.
In a DAG as the one above, an arrow between two nodes represents that the
two nodes are never statistically independent. In this way, arrows encode which
variables provide fundamental information about other variables, in the sense that
the information transmitted by the source is not contained in any other variable.
For instance, the DAG in figure 4 conveys that w and j contain fundamental
information about i and thus i is never independent from tw, ju. Likewise, i is
never independent of it’s direct descendant, k. Now, consider a variable that is
an ancestor of i; for example, a. Clearly, a and i are not independent: a provides
fundamental information about j which provides fundamental information about
i. However, any information a has about i is implicitly encoded in j P Papiq.
Indeed, if a carried fundamental information about i, there should be an arrow
a Ñ i, but such arrow is absent. Likewise, b provides information about i: b is
informative about ta, wu, both of which are informative about i. However, any
information b has about i is encoded in tj, wu. What this implies is that, once
we condition on the parents of i (in this case, tw, ju), all non-descendants of i are
conditionally independent of i. Therefore, the terms µpxi|NDpiqq in equation 6
simplify to µpxi|Papiqq. This observation motivates definition 5 below.
19
Definition 5. Let µ P ∆pΠiPNXiq. A DAG pt1, ..., Nu, Eq represents µ if, and
only if, the following hold:
p@x P ΠiPNXiq,
µpxq “ ΠNi“1µpxi|Papiqq
p@pTiqiPN qpTi Ă Papiqq, if µpxq “ Π
N
i“1µpxi|Tiq ñ p@i P N q, Ti “ Papiq
Definition 5 makes two statements. First, a DAG represents a probability
distribution if, and only if, the DAG summarizes the conditional independence
properties of µ in the sense discussed previously. Second, the set of parents is
the smallest set that allows for such a decomposition. Indeed, consider a set of
nodes V “ ta, b, cu and a probability distribution µpxa, xb, xcq “ µpxaqµpxbqµpxcq.
Since all variables are statistically independent, both DAGs in Figure 5 represent
this µ. Indeed, both µpxa, xb, xcq “ µpxaqµpxb|xaqµpxc|xaq and µpxa, xb, xcq “
µpxaqµpxbqµpxcq are true statements. However, the first representation includes
irrelevant arrows: the minimality requirement prevents this.
Xa Xb Xc
Xa Xb Xc
Figure 5: Both DAGs above represent the same probability distribution,
µpxa, xb, xcq “ µpxaqµpxbqµpxcq, but the top one includes irrelevant arrows.
Using definition 5 we can define when a graph represents a standard Savage
preference. Suppose that ą was the DM’s Savage preference defined onRX . Under
Assumption 1 there is a well defined belief representation of ą, µ P ∆pXq. We can
then say that a graph G represents ą if G represents µ, in the sense of definition
5.
However, definition 5 is not enough to define when a graph represents a preference
ą¯. Indeed, a preference ą¯ is associated with the collection of induced Savage
preferences tąp: p P Pu. As such, ą¯ is associated to a family of beliefs, rather
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than a single belief, as in Savage’s model. Thus, to define when a DAG represents
preferences ą¯, we first define what it means for a DAG to represent a collection
of probability distributions rather than a single probability distribution.
To define when a DAG represents preferences ą¯, we first define the truncation of
a DAG. Let G “ pV,Eq be a DAG, and let W Ĺ V . The W -truncated DAG, GW ,
is the DAG obtained by eliminating all nodes in W , together with their incoming
and outgoing arrows. Formally, GW “ pV zW,EXW
AˆW Aq. This DAG is a useful
representation of intervention beliefs. After variables inW are intervened, they no
longer form part of the DM’s statistical model; they are now deterministic objects
that are statistically uninformative about the value of their parents. Thus, we
exclude these variables from the corresponding DAG. For example, if Alex observes
that Mr. Kane obtained a college degree, then his education level is no longer
random, but Alex can still make inference about Mr. Kane’s intellectual ability.
Thus, education remains a legitimate element of Alex’s statistical model. However,
if Mr. Kane’s education is intervened to “college degree”, then his eduction level is
no longer random and, furthermore, is uninformative about his ability level. Thus,
we exclude education level from the DM’s post-intervention model.
A
E
L
A
L
Figure 6: Right: the full econometric model; knowing E is informative about L
because knowing E is informative of it’s cause, A.
Left: once E is intervened it is no longer part of the econometric DAG since E is
uninformative about it’s causes.
We can now define when a DAG, G, represents a preference ą¯. We then say a
graph represents a preference if the appropriately truncated subgraph represents
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the corresponding intervention preference and the arrows are consistent with the
direction of causality. This is formally presented in definition 6 below.
Definition 6. Let G “ pN , Eq be a DAG and ą¯ be a DM’s preference. Assume
that for each T Ă N and each xT P XT , ąxT has a well defined belief representa-
tion; let µxT be the corresponding belief representation. We say that G represents
ą¯ if the following are true for each T Ă N and each x P X:
i GT represents µxT ,
ii If pi, jq P E then µxti,juA pxj |xiq “ µxtjuA pxjq.
Notice that nothing in this section is related to causality. Indeed, the statement
that a graph represents a probability distribution is purely a statement about
statistical independence. As such, the representation of a probability by a DAG
is a statement about correlation, not causation. At this point in the exposition,
DAGs used to represent probability distributions and DAGs used to represent
causal statements are completely unrelated. It is precisely the job of Theorems
1 and 2 to show the exact conditions under which a DAG can simultaneously
represent the DMs beliefs as well as the DMs causal model.
6 Results
Our first theorem is Theorem 1, stated below.
Theorem 1. Let ą¯ satisfy Assumption 1. The following are equivalent:
i Axioms 1 through 3 hold,
ii pDGq such that G is a DAG and represents ą¯ in the sense of Definition 6.
Furthermore, if G represents ą¯, then G “ Gpą¯q.
The literature of Bayesian graphs assumes that causal DAGs fulfill a dual role:
they represent both causal assumptions and assumptions on conditional indepen-
dence. This is clearly a joint assumption about how the analyst defines causality,
and how the analyst’s definition of causality interacts with statements of condi-
tional independence. Theorem 1 states the exact conditions under which a DAG
can fulfill this dual role.
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In particular, the uniqueness result implies that Definition 2 is the only definition
of causality that satisfies our axioms. Suppose a researcher has a definition of
causality in mind (say, C) so that statements of the form “i causes j according to
criterion C” are well defined. If C satisfies our axioms then C can be represented
via a DAG, G, such that i Ñ j holds if, and only if, “i causes j according to
criterion C”. The uniqueness claim in Theorem 1 says that G “ Gpą¯q. Therefore,
i Ñ j also holds if, and only if, i causes j in the sense of definition 2. Thus, C
must coincide with Definition 2.
Theorem 1 also provides a foundation for unifying and structuring our under-
standing of causation. The theorem states that any formal discussion of causality
(as understood by Definition 2) begins with two items: a collection of probability
laws, tµp P ∆pXN ppqq : p P Pu, and a DAG, G, that represents those laws. Models
that include these components can legitimately be called models of “causation”
regardless of any other details the model might include. However, models that can-
not be phrased in terms of intervention beliefs and their representing DAG are not
models of causality (again, as understood by Definition 2). In short, researchers
that find our axioms normatively appealing, and that agree that definition 2 is a
sensible definition of causal effect, are encouraged to use DAG-based models for
conducting causal inference. Researchers who find our axioms normatively unap-
pealing, or disagree with definition 2 as a sensible definition of causal effect, are
encourage to stay away from DAG-based models. In this way, Theorem 1 provides
a foundation for selecting among models with which to empirically study causal ef-
fects. As usual, whether the axioms are normatively appealing or not is something
each reader has to decide for themselves.
6.1 Identification of intervention beliefs
In this section, we consider the following question. Let µ P ∆pXq be the DM’s
beliefs elicited from his Savage preference and µp be the DM’s beliefs elicited
from an intervention preference ąp. When can we express µp as a function of µ?
Proposition 1 and Theorem 2 in this section answer this question.
Answering the question above is useful to make the model applicable to empirical
research. When µp is expressed in terms of µ (henceforth, when µp is identified),
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any information that allows a DM to update his Savage beliefs, µ, also allows the
DM to update his intervention beliefs, µp. If an analyst had access to a perfectly
controlled setting, the analyst could estimate each µp directly and models of causal
inference would be unnecessary. However, most empirical work in economics is
observational, in the sense that direct policy interventions are unavailable to the
researcher. Proposition 1 and Theorem 2 bridge the gap between intervention
beliefs –what the econometrician wants to estimate– and standard conditional
probabilities –what the econometrician can estimate.
When added to Axioms 1 through 3, Axiom 4 yields a model in which different
intervention beliefs, µp, can be expressed in terms of µ. In what follows, we remind
the reader of Axiom 4 and illustrate Theorem 2 by means of two simple examples.
Then, we state and discuss the general form of Theorem 2.
Axiom 4. p@i P N q, p@J Ă tiuAq p@f, g P RXiq, p@xCapiqYJ P XCapiqYJ q,
1txCapiquf ą 1txCapiqug ô 1xCapiqzJ f ąxJ 1xCapiqzJ g.
Example 2. Blake is an econometrician who believes that ability causes both
education and lifetime earnings and also that education causes lifetime earnings.
This model is graphically depicted in Figure 7. To understand the direct effect
of education on lifetime earnings, Blake has to understand how µa,ep¨q changes
with e P E, for each fixed a P A. However, Blake cannot access a controlled
environment, so Blake has no data on µpa,eq. However, under Axiom 4 data from
controlled environments is unnecessary. When J “ tA,Eu, Axiom 4 implies
µpa,eqp¨q “ µp¨|a, eq. Thus, the direct causal effect of education on lifetime earnings
is calculated by computing how µp¨|a, eq varies with e for each value of a. Note
that µp¨|a, eq is a standard conditional probability, and data on this quantity can be
estimated with access to observational datasets. Blake can therefore use data from
outside a controlled environment to form his intervention beliefs.
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L
Figure 7: Causal effects are identified: µpa,eqplq“µpl|a,eq.
Example 3. Charlie is a colleague of Blake. However, Charlie believes that
people are not born with intrinsic ability. By the contrary, it is education that
causes ability, and this ability is the sole cause of lifetime earnings. Charlie’s causal
DAG is depicted in Figure 8. Charlie is interested in studying the indirect effect
that education policies have on lifetime earnings, which can be done by applying
Axiom 4 twice. First, set J “ tEu, i “ A to obtain µapeq “ µpe|aq for each
pa, eq P A ˆ E. Second, set J “ tEu, i “ L to obtain µepl|aq “ µpl|aq for each
pe, a, lq P E ˆ Aˆ L. Finally, we obtain the following derivation.
µeplq “
ÿ
a
µepl, aq
“
ÿ
a
µepl|aqµepaq
“
ÿ
a
µpl|aqµpa|eq.
Thus, calculating the indirect effects of E and L requires computing µpl|aq and
µpa|eq, both of which can be computed with data from observational studies. Even
if access to a controlled environment is unavailable, the identification of µe implies
that such data is unnecessary.
25
AE
L
Figure 8: Indirect causal effect of E on L is identified: µeplq “
ř
a µpl|aqµpa|eq.
The examples highlight two simple cases in which intervention beliefs are iden-
tified. First, if j is a cause of i, then the direct causal effect that j has on i is
identified via the formula µxti,juA ,xjpxiq “ µpxi|xj , xCapiqztjuq. Thus, one can obtain
the direct causal effect of j on i by conditioning on all causes of i and analyzing
how that conditional probability varies with xj . Similarly, if j causes k, k causes
i, and this is the only connection between j and i, the indirect causal effect of
j on i is calculated by following the chain rule: µxjpxiq “
ř
xk
µpxi|xkqµpxk|xjq.
However, other intervention beliefs may also be identified. The rest of this section
is devoted to understanding the exact conditions under which intervention beliefs
are identified.
Given a family of intervention beliefs and a DAG that represents these beliefs,
what is the set of all intervention beliefs that are identified, and how are they
identified? Answering this question requires two definitions : we need to define
specific truncations of a DAG and we need the definition of a blocked path. We
provide these definitions and then formally state the result. Appendix B discusses
the intuition behind why we need these definitions.
Definition 7. Given G and three disjoint sets of variables I,J ,K Ă N , the
truncated DAGs GIin, GJ out, and GIin,J pKqout are defined as follows:
1 GIin is obtained from G by eliminating all arrows pointing to nodes in I,
2 GIin,J out is obtained from G by eliminating all arrows emerging from nodes
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in J and all arrows pointing to nodes in I,
3 GIin,J pKqin is obtained by eliminating all arrows pointing to nodes in J pKq
and I, where J pKq is the set of J nodes that are not ancestors of any K
nodes in GIin.
The following figures show the base DAG, G, and its corresponding trunca-
tions. In all cases, J “ tJ0, J1u, I “ tIu, K “ tKu.
J1
K J0 I
(a) The base DAG, G.
J1
K J0 I
(b) DAG GIin obtained by eliminating all
arrows into I.
J1
K J0 I
(c) DAG GIin,J out obtained by:
(i) eliminating arrows into I, and (ii)
eliminating all arrows emerging from J0
and J1.
J1
K J0 I
(d) DAG GIin,J pKqin obtained by:
(i) eliminating all arrows into I, and (ii)
eliminating all arrows into J0 since J0 is
the only J node that is not an ancestor of
a K node.
Figure 9: Different truncations of a DAG.
For the following definition, suppose Q is an undirected path between two
nodes, i.e. a collection of nodes, regardless of directionality, and that q is a node
on Q. For example, Figure 9 shows an undirected path Q “ pJ1, I, J0, Kq from J1
to K. We say that Q has converging arrows at q if there exist nodes q0 and q1 that
are adjacent to q in Q such that q0 Ñ q Ð q1. For example, path Q “ pJ1, I, J0, Kq
has converging arrows at I. We say that Q does not have converging arrows at
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q if for all nodes q0 and q1 that are adjacent to q in Q, either q0 Ñ q Ñ q1 or
q0 Ð q Ñ q1 holds. For example, Q “ pJ1, I, J0, Kq does not have converging
arrows at J0.
Definition 8. Let I,J ,K be three disjoint sets of variables, and let Q be an
undirected path between a node in I and a node in J . We say K blocks Q if there
exists a node q on Q such that one of the following conditions holds:
• Q has converging arrows at q, and neither q nor any of its descendants is in
K,
• Q does not have converging arrows at q and q P K.
Below, we state the two rules of causal calculus and Proposition 1. Versions
of these rules are well known in causal statistics (see Pearl [16] and Huang and
Valtorta [11]), and we comment on the connections in the next section.
Rule 1. (Exchanging intervention and observation.) Let I0, I1, I2, I3 be disjoint
sets of variables. If I1 Y I3 block all paths from I0 to I2 in graph GIin
1
,Iout
2
, then
µxI1 ,xI2 pxI0 |xI3q “ µxI1 pxI0 |xI2 , xI3q. (7)
Rule 2. (Eliminating interventions.) Let I0, I1, I2, I3 be disjoint sets of variables.
If I1 Y I3 block all paths from I0 to I2 in graph GIin
1
,I2pI3qin , then
µxI1 ,xI2 pxI0 |xI3q “ µxI1 pxI0 |xI3q. (8)
Proposition 1. Let ą¯ satisfy Axioms 1 through 3, let G represent ą¯, and let
tµp : p P Pu be the DM’s intervention beliefs. Then, the following statements are
equivalent.
• ą¯ satisfies Axiom 4.
• Rules 1 and 2 hold. Furthermore, if µp is identified for some p P P, then the
identification is obtained by iterative application of these two rules.
With Proposition 1, we can refer to Example 3 and obtain the identification
result by applying Rules 1 and 2. In Rule 2, set I0 “ tLu, I1 “ H, I2 “ tEu, and
I3 “ tAu. The corresponding truncated DAG is G itself. In G, A blocks the unique
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path from E to L since no converging arrows exist at A. Thus, µepl|aq “ µpl|aq.
Likewise, in Rule 1, set I0 “ tAu, I1 “ H, I2 “ tEu, and I3 “ H. In the
truncated graph that results, E is isolated from all other variables, so any path
from E to A is blocked; thus, µepaq “ µpa|eq. These two conclusions yield the
identification of µeplq “
ř
a µpl|aqµpa|eq.
6.2 Markov representations and do-probabilities
Proposition 1 is obtained purely from adding Axiom 4 to the list of Axioms
imposed on ą¯. As such, Rules 1 and 2 depend only on the Axioms. However, Pearl
[16] and Huang and Valtorta [11] obtain similar results using a formalism called
do-probability. In this section we define what do-probabilities, and we explore the
connections between do-probabilities and intervention beliefs. We also explore the
contribution of our results to the do-probability framework.
Definition 9. Let µ P ∆pXq. For each i P N , let µi be the marginal over Xi. For
each i P N , let εi be a random variable with range Ei, let G be the DAG defined by a
family of sets of parents pPapiqqiPN , and let hi be a function hi : XPapiqˆ Ei Ñ Xi.
Let φ be the joint distribution of the vector pε1, ..., εNq. A Markov representation
of µ is a tuple pG, ph1, ..., hNq, pε1, ..., εNqq that satisfies the following:
• p@i, jq, εi is independent of εj,
• µ can be recovered implicitly as a solution to the following system of equa-
tions:
µipxiq “ φptε : hipxPapiq, εiq “ xiuq, pi P t1, ..., Nuq. (9)
Markov representations are used in statistical causality to numerically repre-
sent causal effects (see Pearl [16]). The interpretation is as follows. Each variable
i is a deterministic function of a set of variables, Papiq, and idiosyncratic noise,
εi. Each hi is interpreted as a random production function for variable i, with
Papiq as the set of inputs and εi as the random component. The causal effect of
a variable j on i is (loosely speaking) calculated by observing how hip¨q changes
as we change the value of variable j. For a more precise statement, we need the
definition of do-probability, which we take from Pearl [16]. See examples 4 and 5
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in Appendix C for a concrete illustration of how to calculate do-probabilities and
how they differ from standard conditional probabilities.
Definition 10. Let µ P ∆pXq be a probability distribution, and let pph1, ..., hNq, pε1, ..., εNqq
be a Markov representation of µ. Given two disjoint sets of variables, I and J ,
the do-probability µpxI |dopxJ qq is calculated as follows:
1 For all j P J , eliminate from system (9) in Definition 9 all the formulas
µjpxjq “ φptε : hjpxPapjq, εiq “ xju.
2 For each i R J and for each j P Papiq X J , input value xj into the corre-
sponding formula in system (9) of Definition 9.
3 Calculate the probability of realization xI in the model resulting from applying
steps 1 and 2 above.
While do-probabilities are commonly referred to as the causal effect of one vari-
able on another, it is important to be cautious with the language. Do-probabilities
reflect the effect that an intervention on a set of variables has on the whole system
of equations; that is, do-probabilities capture both the direct and indirect effects of
interventions. For example, consider the DAG in Figure 10. This DAG states that
there is no direct causal effect of A on C; however, PrpxC|dopxAqq “ PrpxC |xAq,
which is a non-trivial function of xA. Indeed, intervening A has an effect on B,
which in turn, affects C. In this example, PrpxC |dopxAqq captures this indirect
effect. In line with our definition of causal effect, the causal effect of A on C is
given by how PrpxC|dopxA, xBqq changes with xA. In this case, PrpXc|dopxA, xBqq
is a constant function of xA, which is consistent with A having no direct causal
impact on xC .
A B C
Figure 10: A has no direct causal effect on C, but prpxC |dopxAqq is a non-trivial
function of xA.
Having defined Markov representations and do-probabilities, we can now state
Theorem 2.
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Theorem 2. Let ą¯ satisfy Assumption 1, and let pµxIqIĂN be the subjective beliefs
elicited from ą¯. The following statements are equivalent:
• Axioms 1 through 3, and 4 hold,
• There exists a Markov representation of µ, pG, ph1, ..., hNq, pε1, ..., εNqq, such
that
– p@J Ă N q, p@xJ P XJ q; µxJ “ µp¨|dopxJ qq P ∆pXJ Aq,
– G represents ą¯.
Furthermore, if G represents ą¯, then G “ Gpą¯q.
The crucial contribution of Theorem 2 is that it clarifies the role of do-probabilities
in the understanding of causal effects. Do-probabilities are often presented as
the definition of a causal effect. As Pearl writes in [17]: “ the definition of a
“cause” is clear and crisp; variable X is a probabilistic-cause of variable Y if
P py|dopxqq ‰ P pyq for some values x and y.” Theorem 1 states that one can legit-
imately represent causal effects based on interventions via a DAG which, nonethe-
less, is incompatible with any system of do-probabilities. The causal DAG will be
compatible with a set of do-probabilities only when adding Axiom 4 to the list
of basic axioms. This result is analogous to the exercise conducted by Machina-
Schmeidler [15]: just as expected utility and probabilistic sophistication can be be-
haviorally separated, we show that the graph theoretic aspects of Pearl-like models
can be separated from the do-probability formalism. The substantive assumptions
about causality are conveyed by the DAG, while do-probabilities represent an ad-
ditional assumption about when interventions and simple observations can be used
interchangeably. In short, the notion of causality represented by a do-probability
is strictly stronger that the notion of causality represented by a DAG.
Theorem 2 further clarifies that Axiom 4 is the fundamental property that links
do-probabilities with intervention beliefs. When defining Markov representations,
the functions hp¨q are not indexed by whether their arguments have been observed
or intervened. The functions hp¨q only care about the numerical values of their
arguments and not the method through which these numerical values are obtained.
This is an implicit assumption of the Pearl model and it is delivered by Axiom 4.
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Jointly, Proposition 1 and Theorem 2 imply that Pearl’s rules of causal calculus
serve as an axiomatization of do-probability. Indeed, Huang and Valtorta [11]
show that, in a do-probability model, Rules 1 and 2 summarize all obtainable
identification results. To the best of our knowledge, whether other probabilistic
models are consistent with the aforementioned result is unknown. We show that
when Rules 1 and 2 summarize all obtainable identification results, Axiom 4 must
hold so that intervention beliefs are do-probabilities. Therefore, the rules of causal
calculus are a complete description of all obtainable identification results if, and
only if, the intervention probabilities are do-probabilities.
As a final remark on Theorem 2, notice that Definition 9 implicitly requires
that the Markov representation that defines do-probabilities has a unique solution.
While this characteristic has sometimes been pointed to as a limitation of the
theory (see Halpern [6]), under Axiom 4, this result is without loss of generality.
7 Literature Review
In economic theory, the work most closely related to ours is a series of papers by
Spiegler ([20], [21], [22]). The main difference is the focus of the papers. Spiegler’s
work does not provide a definition of the term “causal effect”, except that it can
be represented via a DAG that satisfies two properties. First, the DAG factorizes
the correlation structure in the DM’s beliefs; second, the arrows in the DAG are
interpreted as pointing from cause to effect. Given these assumptions, Spiegler asks
what types of mistake a DM with a misspecified causal model might make. In our
paper, we first define what a causal relation is and then seek to understand which
axioms on behavior allow us to represent causal effects in the language of DAGs
that factorize the DM’s beliefs. The uniqueness claim in Theorem 1 provides the
point of contact between both papers. Under our definition of causality, a DAG can
simultaneously factorize the DM’s beliefs while retaining a causal interpretation
only if Axioms 1 through 3 hold. Furthermore, under the axioms, a graph G both
represents a DM’s correlation structure and is interpreted causally (in the sense
that arrows point from cause to effect) only is the definition of causal effect is as
in Definition 2.
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In decision theory, Karni ([12], [13]) explores models where a DM can affect the
states that are realized. In those papers, the primitive objects are a set of actions
and a set of consequences. States of nature are defined as a mappings from actions
a DM might take to consequences that arise from those actions; that the mapping
ActionÑ Outcome is stochastic reflects that states are stochastically realized. A
DM can affect the states that occur by making an appropriate choice of action.
This idea is similar to our idea of a policy intervention, since a policy p can be
seen as an action the DM takes that affects the realization of states. Indeed,
we can set Karni’s set of action to our set P, Karni’s outcomes to realizations
of our state space, X , and a Karni state is a mapping s : P Ñ X . The main
difference arises in that we impose –objectively– a consistency condition: if a
policy p intervenes variable j to value xj , a state s cannot map this policy to
a realization x1j ‰ xj . Karni has a version of this condition but it is imposed
subjectively in the preferences. Moreover, the focus of Karni’s paper is not to use
these ideas to talk about causal effects, or understand what types of models reflect
normative definitions of causality. Rather, Karni focuses on obtaining subjective
expected utility representations of his preferences. For this reason, while a strong
formal connection exists, the substance of the research agenda is different.
The statistics and computer science literature includes research that uses graphi-
cal methods to represent the conditional independence structure of any given joint
probability law (see Dawid [1], Geiger et al. [4], Lauritzen et al. [14]). Specifically,
Dawid [1] and Geiger et al. [4] show that, given a probability distribution over a set
of variables, pp¨q, and given a graph G that represents p, the D-separation criterion
for graphs (see Definitions 8 and 11) summarizes the independence structure of p.
Our proofs rely on the one-to-one correspondence between variables that satisfy
the D-separation criterion and variables that are conditionally independent. This
is the main point of contact between our paper and that body of work. Lauritzen
et al. [14] provide alternative graphical tests for D-separation which may be used
to obtain alternative proofs for our results.
In causal statistics, the most closely related papers are those in the Bayesian
networks literature (see Spirtes [23], Pearl [16], and follow-up work). Two main
points of contact between that literature and our paper exist. First, the statistical
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causality literature offers no formal definition of the term “causal relation”, and
the exact meaning of this phrase is left to the researcher’s common sense. As Pearl
states “The first step in this analysis is to construct a causal diagram such as the
one given in Fig. [1] (sic.), which represents the investigator’s understanding of
the major causal influences among measurable quantities in the domain” and later
“ The purpose of the paper is not to validate or repudiate such domain-specific
assumptions but, rather, to test whether a given set of assumptions is sufficient for
quantifying causal effects from non-experimental data, for example, estimating the
total effect of fumigants on yields”. Second, the numerical value of the causal effect
of one variable on another (say, Education on Lifetime earnings) is given by the do-
probability formalism. As Pearl writes in [17]: “ the definition of a “cause” is clear
and crisp; variable X is a probabilistic-cause of variable Y if P py|dopxqq ‰ P pyq for
some values x and y.” By contrast, we show that, under Axioms 1 through 4, there
exists a unique definition of causal effect that is both representable via a DAG and
consistent with an interventionist perspective of causality. Thus, we show that
causal models based on causal diagrams implicitly impose a specific definition
of causality. Moreover, Axioms 1 through 4 neither imply, nor are implied by,
a representation of causality in terms of do-probabilities. Contrary to Pearl’s
quote, do-probabilities neither define nor are defined by the definition of causality
embodied by the causal diagram. Theorem 2 shows that under Axioms 1 through
4, causal effects are representable via a DAG that is compatible with the do-
probability formulas. This makes explicit the fundamental restrictions imposed by
using do-probabilities to numerically quantify causal effects.
In terms of axiomatic definitions for causal effects, Galles and Pearl [3], Halpern
[6], and Halpern and Pearl ([7], [8]) provide an alternative approach. Specifically,
Halpern [6] expands on Galles and Pearl [3] and axiomatizes a more general model.
Rather than a decision theoretic approach, Halpern [6] axiomatizes causal effects
through a syntactic logic approach; that is, rather than using a DM’s preferences
over a suitably defined choice domain as a primitive, Halpern’s axiomatization is
in terms of the syntactic structure of a base language. The main results show that
different axioms on the languages considered axiomatize various classes of causal
models. Those papers axiomatize not only the basic Pearl [16] model, which is the
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model we axiomatize here, but also more general models that cannot be captured in
our framework. However, the primitives in those models are not directly associated
with objects that economists use to reason about causality. In particular, whether
the Pearl model is a suitable model for causal analysis in economics is unclear
from the axiomatization. By providing an axiomatic foundation of the same model
based on the choice of Savage acts and policy interventions, we show that the Pearl
model is indeed a suitable choice for reasoning about causality in economics.
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A Proofs
Proposition 2. Let ą¯ “ pąJ qJĂN be a DM’s preferences, and let Gpą¯q “ pN , Eq
be the directed graph defined by setting Papiq “ Capiq for each i P I. If ą¯ satisfies
Assumption 1, then the following are true:
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• If G “ pN , F q is a directed graph that represents ą¯, then pj, iq P F ñ j P
Capiq.
• If G “ pN , F q is a directed graph that represents ą¯, then j P Capiq ñ pj, iq P
F or i P Capjq.
Proof. Let ą¯ be as in the statement of the proposition, Gpą¯q be the directed graph
defined by setting Papiq “ Capiq for each i P N , and G “ pN , F q be any other
directed graph that represents ą¯. For each I Ă N and each realization xI P XI ,
let µxI P ∆pXIAq represent beliefs obtained from ąxI .
We first show j P Capiq ñ pj, iq P F or i P Capjq. If j P Capiq then the function
T : Xj Ñ R defined as T pxjq “ µxti,juA ,xjpxiq is not constant in xj . Also, by
Assumption 1‘, µxti,juA pxi|xjq “ T pxjq. Thus, i and j are not independent after
intervening ti, juA. Because G represents ą¯ then Gti,juA represents ąti,juA . Thus,
either pi, jq P F or pj, iq P F (if not, Gti,juA would treat i and j as independent,
which is a contradiction). If pj, iq P F the proof concludes. Therefore, let pj, iq R
F so that pi, jq P F . Because G represents ą¯ this means that µxti,juA pxj |xiq “
µxtjuA pxjq. By definition, the above equation says i P Capjq, as desired.
We now show pj, iq P F ñ j P Capiq. First, note that for all x P X , µxti,juA pxi, xjq “
µxti,juA pxjqµxti,juA pxi|xjq. Because G represents ą¯, pj, iq P F and the minimality
condition in Definition 5, jointly imply that i and j are not independent after
intervening ti, juA. That is, µxti,juA pxi|xjq is not constant in xj . Moreover, because
G represents ą¯ and pj, iq P F , we get that µxti,juA pxi|xjq “ µxti,juA,xj
pxiq. Therefore,
there is a value of xtjuA for which T pxjq “ µxti,juA,xj
pxiq is not constant in xj .
Therefore, j P Capiq.
Remark 1. Without axiom 2, any representing graph must include the causal links
in the sense of Definition 2 ( i.e., pj, iq P F ñ j P Capiq) but F could omit some
arrows. However, only arrows involved in 2-cycles are omitted.
Before proving Theorem 1, we need two Lemmas. Let i be a variable and I,J
be two disjoint set of variables that do not contain i. It is known from Dawid ([1])
and Pearl ([16]) that i is independent to I conditional on J if, and only if, J
D-separates tiu from I (see below for a definition of D-separation). The next two
lemmas prove that, for each variable i, Capiq D-separates tiu from all sets J that
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satisfy J Ă NDpiq, where NDpiq is the set of non-descendants of i. Furthermore,
Capiq is the smallest set that has this property.
Definition 11. Let I,J ,K Ă N be three disjoint set of variables. We say K
D- separates I from J if for each undirected path between a variable in I and a
variable in J , one of the following properties holds:
• There is a node w along the path such that w is a collider (that is, there are
nodes w0, w1 in the path such that w0 Ñ w Ð w1), and such that w R K and
K Ă NDpwq.
• There is a node w along the path such that w is not a collider, and such that
w P K.
Lemma 1. Fix K Ă N and xK P XK. Let GK represent ąxK. For each i P N ,
CapiqzK D-separates tiu from NDpiqzK ” tjˆ P KA : i is not an indirect cause of jˆ. u.
Proof. Pick j P tjˆ P KA : i is not an indirect cause of jˆ. u Pick an undirected
trail t from j to i. That is, t “ pi0, ..., iNq where i0 “ j, iN=i, and, for each
n P t1, ..., Nu, either pin´1, inq P E or pin, in´1q P E. First, since i is not an
indirect cause of j, then t cannot be a directed path from i to j. That is, t cannot
be such that pin, in´1q P E for each n. Second, if t is a directed path from j to i
(that is, pin´1, inq P E for each n), then t is blocked by iN´1 P CapiqzK. Third,
assume that t is not directed in any direction. Then, t has colliders and/or tail-to-
tail nodes. Let in be the last node that is either a collider or a tail-to-tail node. Let
q “ pin, ..., iNq be the trail starting at in. By definition of in, q must be directed.
Assume that q is directed from in to i. Then, in is tail-to tail. Then, t, is blocked
by iN´1. Finally, assume that q is directed from i to in. Then, in is a collider. If
in P CapiqzK then pin, i, qq is a cycle. Thus, in R CapiqzK. By a similar argument,
no descendants of in can be in CapiqzK. Therefore, in blocks t. Since each trail
joining j to i is blocked, this concludes the proof.
Lemma 2. Fix K Ă N , xK P XK, and i P K
A. Let GK represent ąxK. If T Ă K
A
satisfies that T D-separates tiu from NDpiq, then CapiqzK Ă T
Proof. Let K, i, and T be as in the statement of the Lemma. Assume w P CapiqzK.
Then, w P NDpiq because otherwise GK would not be acyclic. Consider the path
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w Ñ i. Then, T can D-separate this path only if w P T . Thus, CapiqzK Ă T .
Lemma 3. Assume Axiom 3 holds. Then, p@i P N q, p@j such that i R ICapjqq
and p@K Ă N zti, juq,
i KK pCapjqzKzCapiqq|pCapiqzKq
Proof. Let i P N be arbitrarily chosen and j, K be as in the statement of the
theorem. Define the following sets:
Ca0pjq “ tt : t P ICapjq, , Captq “ H, and t R Capiqu
Ca1pjq “ tt : t P ICapjq, Captq Ă Ca0pjq, and t R Capiqu
p...q
Cakpjq “ tt : t P ICapjq, Captq Ă Yk´1n“0Ca
0pjq, and t R Capiqu.
Axiom 3 implies the following:
i K Ca0pjq|Capiq.
The above follows because i R Ca0pjq (since i R ICapjq) and because CapCa0pjqq “
H. By induction, Axiom 3 implies the following for all k:
i K Capjq| Ykn“0 Ca
npjq.
We already showed the above is true for k “ 0. Assume it is true for some value
k. We need to show it is true for k ` 1. Notice that CapCak`1pjqq Ă Ykn“0Ca
nptq
by definition. Then, by axiom 3, i KK Ca
k`1pjq|Capiq Y Ykn“0Ca
npjq. Moreover,
by inductive hypothesis, i KK Y
k
n“0Ca
npjq|Capiq. Thus, i KK pY
k
n“0Ca
npjq Y
Capjqk`1q|Capiq. Since Capjq “ Y8n“0Capjq
n, this completes the proof.
As a corollary of the Lemma 3, we obtain the Markov property: i KK j|CapiqzK
whenever i R ICapjq. Indeed, by the intersection property of conditional indepen-
dence, i KK j|Capiq Y Capjq and i KK Capjq|Capiq implies i KK j|Capiq.
Theorem 1. Let ą¯ satisfy Assumption 1. The following are equivalent:
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• Axioms 1 and 3 hold,
• pDGq such that G is a DAG, and represents ą¯.
Furthermore, if G represents ą¯, then G “ Gpą¯q.
Proof. The uniqueness claim is proved in Proposition 2.
We now prove that the axioms imply the existence of a representation. Without
loss of generality, label the variables so that j ă i implies j P NDpiq. Construct
G by setting Papiq “ Capiq. By axiom 1, G is acyclic. Indeed, if for some
length k P N there was a cycle e “ ppi1, i2q, pi2, i3q, ..., pik, i1qq, then i1 would be
an indirect cause of itself. Pick any set K Ă N and any realization xK P XK.
We need to show that µxKpxKAq “ ΠiPKAµxKpxi|Capiq XK
Aq. By our enumeration,
tj R K : j ă iu Ă tj P N : i is not an indirect cause of ju. Through Lemma 3,
Axiom 3 implies that µxKpxi|xtjRK:jăiuq “ µxKpxi|xCapiqXKAq. By the chain rule,
we know µxKpxKAq “ Π
N
i“1,iRKµxKpxi|xtjRK:jăiuq. Combining the last two claims,
µxKpxKAq “ Π
N
i“1,iRKµxKpxi|xCapiqXKAq, which is what we wanted to prove. We
now prove minimality of Capiq. Assume J Ĺ Capiq. Axiom 2 states that i MK
pCapiqzKzJ q|J . Thus, the factorization formula is minimal.
Now, suppose G is a DAG that represents ą¯. By our uniqueness claim, without
loss of generality G is such that Papiq “ Capiq. By contrapositive, that G is acyclic
implies Axiom 1 holds. If Axiom 1 did not hold, there exists i and there exists a
sequence pi, i1, ..., iT , iq such that i P Capi1q, for all t P t1, ..., T ´ 1u, it P Capit`1q,
and iT P Capiq. Thus, ppi, i1q, ..., pit´1, itq, ..., piT , iqq is a cycle in G. Axiom 2 holds
by the minimality requirement in the definition of representation. Indeed, if there
was K, J such that i KK pCapiqzKzJ q|J then the representation would not be
minimal. To see that Axiom 3 holds, notice that CapiqYCapjqXKA block all paths
from i to j in GK. Indeed, assume p is an undirected path from i to j that is not
blocked, and enumerate p “ pi, i0, ..., iT , jq. Because p is not blocked, i0 R Capiq
and iT R Capjq. Indeed, if either i0 P Capiq or iT P Capjq, then either i0 is not a
collider or iT is not a collider, thus implying that p is blocked by Capiq Y Capjq.
Therefore, p has a collider. Let n be the smallest number such that in is a collider
and m be the largest number such that im is a collider (possibly n “ m). Note
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that, because G is acyclic, in R Capiq and im R Capjq. Because of this, and because
p is not blocked, the following must be true:
• (i) in P Capjq,
• (ii) im P Capiq.
Then, the directed path that goes from i to in, jumps to j, comes back to im, and
skips back to i, is a cycle. 3 This constitutes a contradiction. Thus, there every
path p from i to j is blocked by Capiq Y Capjq. Thus, axiom 3 holds. Similarly,
Capiq Y tju X KA blocks all paths from i to Capjq X KA in GK. Indeed, let p be
an undirected path from i to Capjq, and assume p is not blocked by Capiq Y tju.
Enumerate p “ pi, i0, ..., iT , kq where k P Capjq. Because j P NDpiq then p cannot
be directed from i to k. If i0 P Capiq then i0 blocks p. If i0 R Capiq, since p is not
directed, p has a collider. Let n be the smallest number such that in is a collider.
First, note that in R Capiq because this would constitute a cycle. Second, if in “ j
then j would be a descendant of i, a contradiction. Thus, in R Capiq Y tju, and
hence p is blocked. Thus, axiom 3 holds.
Theorem 2. Let ą¯ satisfy Assumption 1, and let pµxIqIĂN be the subjective beliefs
elicited from ą¯. The following are equivalent:
• Axioms 1 through 4 hold,
• D a Markov representation of µ, pG, ph1, ..., hNq, pε1, ..., εNqq, such that
– p@J Ă N q, p@xJ P XJ q; µxJ “ µp¨|dopxJ qq P ∆pXJ Aq,
– G represents ą¯.
Furthermore, if G represents ą¯, then G “ Gpą¯q.
Proof. The uniqueness claim was proven in 2.
We first show the axioms imply the representation. By Theorem 1, Axioms 1
and 2 imply there exists a DAG G such that G represents ą¯. For each i P N
let Papiq be the set of parents of i in G. Note Papiq “ Capiq by the uniqueness
claim. For each i P N , let εi „ Ur0, 1s. For each realization xi P Xi and each
3Formally, this is the path q “ pi, i0, ...in, j, iT , iT´1, ..., im, iq
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xPapiq P XPapiq, let Ipxi, xPapiqq Ă r0, 1s be an interval of length µxPapiqpxiq. Becauseř
xiPXi
µxPapiqpxiq “ 1 for each xPapiq, then Ip¨, xPapiqq can be chosen to form a par-
tition of r0, 1s. Fix any variable i P N , let hipxPapiq, εiq “
ř
xiPXi
xi1Ipxi,xPapiqqpεiq.
By construction, pG, ph1, ..., hNq, pε1, ..., εNqq is a Markov representation of the be-
liefs elicited from ą¯. Pick any J Ă N and any i P J A. By Axiom 4, for each
xi P Xi, and each xCapiqYJ P XCapiqYJ , we obtain
µxJ pxi|xCapiqzJ q “ µpxi|xCapiqq. (10)
Our Markov representation implies
µpxi|xCapiqq “ φptε : hipxCapiq, εiq “ xiuq
“ µpxi|dopxJ q, xCapiqzJ q. (11)
By 10 and 11, µxJ pxi|xCapiqzJ q “ µpxi|dopxJ q, xCapiqzJ q. Because G represents ą¯,
for each x P X ,
µxJ pxJ Aq “ Π
N
i“1,iRJµxJ pxi|xCapiqzJ q
“ ΠNi“1,iRJµpxi|dopxJ q, xCapiqzJ q “ µpxJ A |dopxJ qq.
Thus, µxJ p¨q “ µp¨|dopxJ qq P ∆pXJ Aq.
We now show the representation implies the axioms. If there exists a DAG G that
represents ą¯ then axioms 1 and 2 hold is proven in Theorem 1. Let i P N , J Ă tiuA,
f, g P RXi , xJ P XJ and xCapiqzJ P XCapiqzJ be arbitrarily selected. We know form
the Markov representation that for each xi P Xi, µ
i
xJ
pxi|xCapiqzJ q “ µ
ipxi|xCapiqq,
where µi denotes the marginal of µ on Xi. Thus, Axiom 4 holds.
Proposition 1 is a direct consequence of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, which is
stated and proven below.
Theorem 3. Let µ¯ “ tµp : p P Pu be a collection of intervention beliefs, and let
G be a DAG that represent µ¯. If equations 7 and 8 hold, then Axiom 4 holds.
Proof. Let µ¯ and G be as in the theorem. Let i P N and J Ă tiuA. We want
to show that µpxi|xCapiqq “ µxJ pxi|xCapiqzJ q. Let J
˚ ” J X Capiq; that is, J ˚
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are those variables in J that are direct causes of i. Thus, we need to show that
µpxi|xCapiqq “ µxJ pxi|xCapiqzJ ˚q; we do this in two steps.
First we show that µpxi|xCapiqq “ µxJ˚ pxi|xCapiqzJ ˚q. To so this, notice that
CapiqzJ ˚ blocks any path from tiu to J ˚ in the graph GpJ zJ ˚qin,pJ ˚qout . Indeed, let
p be any path from i to some j P J ˚ in graphGpJ zJ ˚qin,pJ ˚qout . Write p “ pi0, ..., iT q
where i0 “ i and iT “ j. Because j P Capiq, then p cannot be a directed path
from i to j, or else G would have a cycle. Likewise, p cannot be a directed path
from j to i since GpJ zJ ˚qin,pJ ˚qout has no arrows emerging from j. Therefore,
p has a collider or a tail-to-tail node. Let w be the first node that is either a
collider or a tail-to-tail node. First, assume w is tail-to-tail. Then p is of the form
i Ð i1p...q Ð w Ñ p...qj. Then i1 P CapiqzJ
˚: indeed, i1 P Capiq and i1 R J
˚
(since there are no arrows emerging from nodes in J ˚). Furthermore, i1 is not a
collider. Then, i1 blocks p. Now, assume w is a collider rather than tail-to-tail.
Then p is of the form i Ñ i1p...q Ñ w Ð p...qj. Then, w is a descendant of
i, so neither w nor any w descendant is in Capiq. A fortori, neither w nor any
descendant of w is in CapiqzJ ˚. Thus, w blocks p. Therefore, by formula 7 we
have µpxi|xCapiqq “ µxJ˚ pxi|xCapiqzJ ˚q.
Second, we show µxJ˚ pxi|xCapiqzJ ˚q “ µxJ˚YpJ zJ˚qpxi|xCapiqzJ ˚q. This is because
Capiq blocks all paths between i and J zJ ˚ in graph GJ zJ ˚pCapiqzJ ˚qin . To see
this, notice that if J zJ ˚ contains only non-descendants of i, then the result is a
direct consequence of lemma 1. Let p be a path (not necessarily directed) between
i and j P J zJ ˚. By contradiction, assume that j P J zJ ˚ is a descendant of
i. Then, j R Capiq and j is not an ancestor of any node in Capiq. Therefore,
j P J zJ ˚pCapiqzJ ˚q, so there are no arrows into j. Therefore, no path from i to
j can be directed in any direction, so there is at least one collider or tail-to-tail
node. Let w be the first such node, and assume w is a collider. Then, p is of the
form i Ñ p...q Ñ w Ð p...q Ð j. Then, neither w nor any descendant of w can
be in Capiq, so p is blocked by Capiq. Alternatively, say w is a tail-to-tail node.
Then, p is of the form i Ð i1p...q Ð w Ñ p...q Ð j (with possibly w “ i1). Then,
i1 P Capiq and i1 is not a collider. Thus, Capiq “ J
˚YpCapiqzJ ˚q blocks p. Thus,
by formula 8, µxJ˚ pxi|xCapiqzJ ˚q “ µxJ˚YpJ zJ˚qpxi|xCapiqzJ ˚q “ µxJ pxi|xCapiqzJ q.
Combining this with the first step, we conclude µpxi|xCapiqq “ µxJ pxi|xCapiqzJ q
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as desired.
B The rules of causal calculus
In this appendix we give some intuition behind why the notion of a block i
relevant for analyzing conditional independence. Furthermore, we give intuition
as to why the truncations in Figure 11a are the relevant truncations for identifying
intervention beliefs. We begin by reminding the reader of the definition of a block.
Definition 12. Let I,J ,K be three disjoint sets of variables, and let p be any
path (not necessarily directed) between a node in I and a node in J . We say K
blocks p if there is a node K on p such that one of the following conditions holds:
• K has converging arrows along p, and neither K nor any of its descendants
is in K, or
• K does not have converging arrows in p, and K is in K.
To illustrate the notion of a block, see Figure 9, replicated below for conve-
nience. In that case, the singleton tKu blocks all paths from J1 to J0. Indeed, one
such path is J1 Ñ K Ñ J0. This path is blocked by tKu because (i) the path has
no converging arrows at K, and (ii) K P tKu. The other path from J1 to J0 is
J1 Ñ I Ð J0. This path is blocked by tKu because I is a node along the path such
that there are converging arrows at I, but neither I nor any of its descendants are
in tKu.
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J1
K J0 I
(a) A base DAG, G.
J1
K J0 I
(b) DAG GIin obtained by eliminating all
arrows into I.
J1
K J0 I
(c) DAG GIin,J out obtained by:
(i) eliminating arrows into I, and (ii) all
arrows emerging from J0 and J1.
J1
K J0 I
(d) DAG GIin,J pKqin obtained by:
(i) eliminating all arrows into I, and (ii)
then eliminating all arrows into J0 since J0
is the only J node which is not an ancestor
of a K node.
Figure 11: Different truncations of a DAG.
The notion of a block is a graphical depiction of conditional independence. In-
deed, that a path exists between two sets of variables, I and J , implies I and J
are (a priori) statistically dependent: any variable w present in a path from I to
J may potentially act as a correlating device between I and J .
In particular, the position of a variable w in a path between I and J is relevant
to the way in which w correlates these variables. Say that there is a path i Ñ
w Ð j, where i P I and j P J ; i.e. there is a path joining I and J that has
converging arrows at w. This implies that observations of w (and its descendants)
are informative about i and j simultaneously. However, interventions of w are
useless for the purposes of predicting the value of either i or j, since neither w
nor any of its descendants are a cause of either i nor j. By contrast, if there is
a path of the from i Ñ w Ñ j or i Ð w Ñ j (i.e. a path with non-converging
arrows) then we know that both observations and interventions of w are useful
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for predicting the values of i and j, though in different ways. In the case where
iÐ w Ñ j, observing or intervening w provides the same joint information about
i and j, since w is a common direct cause of j and i. However, if i Ñ w Ñ j,
intervening w provides information about j (since w is a direct cause of j) but
provides no information about i (since w is neither a direct nor an indirect a
cause of i). In this case, intervening w breaks down the statistical dependence
of i and j in a way that is different to simply conditioning on observations of w.
This sparks a natural question: can the structure of the graph tell us something
about the conditional independence properties of the underlying conditional and
do-probability distributions? This is the object of study in Dawid ([1]), Geiger,
Pearl, and Verma ([4]), Lauritzen et. al ([14]) and others. The rules of causal
calculus are a particular way in which the structure of the graph is informative
about intervention beliefs.
C Two examples of do-probability
Example 4. Consider a set N “ t1, 2, 3u, and a distribution p P ∆pX1ˆX2ˆX3q.
Suppose p has the following Markov Representation:
Pap1q “ H, h1pε1q “ ε1,
Pap2q “ t1u, h2px1, ε2q “ x1 ` ε2,
Pap3q “ t1u, h3px1, x2, ε3q “ x1 ´ ε3.
Then, p can be represented as follows:
ppx1q “ φptε : ε1 “ x1uq,
ppx2q “ φptε : x1 ` ε2 “ x2uq “ φptε : ε1 ` ε2 “ x2uq,
ppx3q “ φptε : x1 ´ ε3 “ x3uq “ φptε : ε1 ´ ε3 “ x3uq.
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Therefore, we can calculate ppx3|dopx2qq, and ppx3|x2q as follows:
ppx3|dopx2qq “ φptε : ε1 ´ ε3 “ x3uq, (12)
ppx3|x2q “ φptε : ε1 ´ ε3 “ x3u|tε : ε1 ` ε2 “ x2uq. (13)
In 12, the equation determining the value x2 is eliminated from the Markov repre-
sentation. This makes the value x2 uninformative about the value of ε1. In (13),
we recognize that variable 2 depends on ε1, so the value x2 gives information about
the value of ε1. Therefore, the do-probability in (12) is independent of the value x2,
whereas the conditional probability in (13) does depend on x2. That ppx2|dopx2qq
is a constant function (when viewed as a function of x2) is intended to reflect that
variable 2 is not a cause of variable 3. That x2 does affect ppx3|x2q captures that
there is a correlation between these two variables (in this example, mediated by
variable 1). The difference between these two calculations highlights the difference
between causation and correlation.
Example 5 below illustrates how to use do-probabilities to identify causal ef-
fects in terms of conditional probabilities only. By connecting intervention beliefs
to do-probabilities, Theorem 2 effectively provides all tools for identifying causal
effects from conditional probabilities. For more detail on this see section 6.1.
Example 5. Assume a DM’s preferences can be represented by the DAG below.
Education Level
Ability
Lifetime Earnings
If this DAG represents a probability distribution that admits a Markov representa-
48
tion then there exist functions hA, hE, hL such that the following holds:
ppL “ l|E “ eq “ Prptε : hLphApεAq, hEphApεAq, εEq, εLq “ lu|hEphApεAq, εEq “ eq,
ppL “ l|dopE “ eqq “ pptε : hLphApεAq, e, εLq “ luq.
Suppose we are interested in quantifying the direct effect that education has on
earnings (graphically represented by the red arrow). However, as the graph shows,
E provides information about L in two ways. The first, is the direct effect (in-
dicated by the red path). The second is through the effect that A has on both E
and L: observing the value of E provides information about A, and A provides di-
rect information on L (as indicated by the blue path). In the first equation, which
corresponds to a conditional probability, we explicitly see that hL depends on A
through hE. In the second line, we eliminate the equation determining education,
and instead directly impute a value of E “ e. In this way we block the dependence
of L on A via E, and only the red effect remains.
As far as quantifying this effect, algebraically manipulating the equations above
yields the following:
ppL “ l|dopE “ eqq “
ÿ
a
ppA “ a, L “ l|dopE “ eqq,
“
ÿ
a
ppA “ a|dopE “ eqqppL “ l|dopE “ eq, A “ aq,
“
ÿ
a
ppA “ aqppL “ l|A “ a, E “ eq, (14)
‰ ppL “ l|E “ eq,
Therefore, if we wish to elicit the direct effect that E has on L, all we need data on
ppA “ aq, ppL “ l|A “ a, E “ eq, and to apply equation (15). Notice also that the
above equation array can be replicated in terms of intervention beliefs and Axiom
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4:
pepL “ lq “
ÿ
a
pepA “ a, L “ lq,
“
ÿ
a
pepA “ aqpepL “ l|A “ aq,
“
ÿ
a
ppA “ aqppL “ l|A “ a, E “ eq, (15)
where the last line applies after applying Axiom 4 noting that (i) the marginal of
A is the same regardless of whether we intervene E or not because CapAq “ H
and (ii) since CapLq “ tA,Eu, then conditioning on A and E or conditioning on
A and intervening E yield the same marginal over L.
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